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I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoﬀ-relevant information either before
or after the contract is signed. To raise eﬃciency, the principal might solicit information; to
retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The
following class of stochastic contracts may solve this trade-oﬀ optimally: before signing,
information acquisition is not solicited, and afterwards randomly. The key insight is that
randomization makes precontractual information costlier for the agent.
Keywords: Information acquisition, Principal-agent, Mechanism design, Randomization
JEL Codes: D82, D83
∗University Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Adenauer Allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn (Germany), e-
mail: sterstiege@uni-bonn.de. I am grateful to Mara Ewers, Johannes Koenen, Daniel Krähmer, Sina Litterscheid
and Dezsö Szalay.
11 Introduction
One purpose of contracts is to resolve informational asymmetry. However, when information
is not veriﬁable by courts, this may prove diﬃcult since an agent possibly gains by misrepre 
senting what he privately knows. Incentive theory shows that contracts can induce truthtelling,
but the agent must get a rent in certain states of the world. As some papers point out, this
incentive compatibility requirement does not impair the prinicpal’s expected proﬁt, when the par 
ties conclude the contract ex ante (before the agent learns the state of the world). In this case, the
principal may retain the entire surplus of the interaction, since she can appropriate in advance the
rent which the agent might enjoy later (e.g. by charging a signing fee).1 Of course, such a scheme
entails a loss for the agent if a state obtains where he cannot secure a rent. Thus, when the parties
conclude the contract ex post (when the agent is already privately informed), the principal must
concede a share of the surplus to guarantee that the agent participates and reveals his private
information.
This paper studies the optimal contract for a situation where the agent himself chooses when
(if at all) to get informed. I consider a procurement relation, where a principal demands parts from
an agent. While the agent’s production costs are initially unknown to both parties, he himself
can ﬁnd out the true realization at some expense. The principal, on the other hand, can neither
observe the state, nor control whether the agent observes it or whether he transmits his ﬁndings
truthfully. Crucially, it is possible for the agent to acquire the information not only after the
contract is signed, but also already between contract oﬀer and signing.2 He may thus check his
earnings from the contract in advance, and reject it when it yields a loss.
The situation involves the following trade oﬀ for the principal. On the one hand, she can possi 
1For a recent contribution, see Esö and Szentes (2007) and the references cited therein. Limited liability of the
agent prevents the appropriation of rents; see e.g. Sappington (1983), who considers a situation involving moral
hazard.
2This assumption amounts to a lag between contract oﬀer and signing. Situations where such lags are inevitable
abound. E.g., before signing a procurement contract, a seller might ﬁrst need to ﬁgure out whether the speciﬁed
quantity can be produced until the speciﬁed date. Or concerning the selling of a car, the potential customer often
ﬁrst has to make sure that she obtains a credit at a bank to be able to pay. Similarly, a successful applicant for a
job may need to discuss with his family before he is able to conﬁrm.
2bly increase the total surplus of the interaction if she tailors her demand according to true produc 
tion costs. To this end, she may instruct the agent to acquire and transmit information—which
requires a rent. On the other hand, the principal would like to deter precontractual information
gathering (i.e., information gathering between contract oﬀer and signing), in order to retain the
entire suplus.
This paper shows that the following kind of stochastic contracts may solve the principal’s
trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and surplus extraction optimally: before signing, she does not solicit
information from the agent, and afterwards randomly with a contractually speciﬁed probability.
The key insight is that contracts for this situation implicitly ﬁx the price of precontractual in 
formation for the agent. Precontractual information would eﬀectively be for free if the principal
requests information after signing with certainty, since the agent anyway bears the costs for in 
formation acquisition in that case. On the other hand, precontractual information has a positive
eﬀective price when information about the state of the world is possibly not solicited after signing
and so would be useless then. In fact, a stochastic contract may elicit information from the agent
with some probability, and yet leave the entire expected surplus to the principal.3
The main point of this paper is that full surplus extraction may be reconciled with incentives
for information acquisition, even though the agent has the costly option to learn his type already
before signing. Beyond this, the paper makes three central contributions. First, it elaborates on
an insight of the seminal paper by Crémer and Khalil (1992), who also study a situation with a
lag between contract oﬀer and signing. The agent can acquire costly information in between, but
obtains it at no cost after the the contract is signed. Like in my model, precontractual information
gathering is just a rent seeking activity, and is deterred by the principal.4 Comparative statics
shows that she would ﬁnd a higher price of precontractual information more desirable. Applied
to reality, where the information e.g. concerns the agent’s skill at performing a certain task, this
insight implies that the principal may have an interest to conceal some details about the agent’s
actual task before signing to make precontractual information gathering costlier. However, in a
framework with complete contracts only a stochastic contract can actually impose uncertainty.
3However, her contract may not maximizes the surplus, since incentive-compatibility constraints must be met.
4In contrast, if several agents compete for the contract, Compte and Jehiel (2008) ﬁnd that the principal possibly
induces precontractual information gathering to ﬁnd an agent with appropriate skills.
3Second, the model closes a gap in the recent literature on mechanism design with endogenous
information.5 That literature examines whether and how to induce the acquisition of costly
information, when information is either available only before or only after signing of the contract.6
For example, in Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a) or Szalay (2009),
the agent can only acquire information between contract oﬀer and signing.7 As a consequence, the
principal possibly induces precontractual information gathering to increase eﬃciency, although
her contract must then be ex post acceptable for the agent. In other papers (Crémer, Spiegel and
Zheng 2009, Krähmer and Strausz 2010), information can only be collected after the contract is
signed, so that just an ex ante form of the participation constraint needs to be met. The respective
optimal contracts that have been proposed in these two strands of literature are in general infeasible
or suboptimal in the present situation, where the agent can gather costly information at either
date. This setting seems to be more natural when information acquisition is an unobservable act.
Third, my analysis provides a new explanation for stochastic contracts. The literature already
provides several theoretical justiﬁcations for stochastic contracts (see Strausz (2006), Kovàč and
Mylovanov (2009), Bester and Krähmer (2010) and Rasul and Sonderegger (2010) for recent con 
tributions).8 It is typically pointed out that randomness in the allocation may serve as a screening
device that relaxes incentive compatibility. In the present paper, on the contrary, the optimal al 
location is deterministic. Randomization only concerns the incentive to acquire information, and
it is used to relax the participation constraint.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 considers
the ﬁrst best. In section 4, I identify the set of contracts which might be oﬀered. Section 5 reviews
the cases without information before or after signing. Section 6 returns to the original situation,
shows that the principal does not solicit information before signing, and states the principal’s
5See Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) for a general setting.
6A diﬀerent strand of the literature considers the situation where information is available only prior to the
contract oﬀer (Crémer and Khalil 1994, Crémer, Khalil and Rochet 1998b, Kessler 1998). In that setting, the
principal’s contract and the agent’s strategy are mutually best responses. In particular, the principal cannot
induce or deter information acquisition.
7The setup of Crémer, Khalil and Rochet is most closely related to this paper’s model. Their optimal contract
is equivalent to the best deterministic contract for the present situation.
8Rasul and Sonderberger review the situations where stochastic contracts may be optimal.
4contracting problem. In section 7, I show that stochastic contracts can be optimal. Section 8
concludes. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 The model
I use a version of the model by Baron and Myerson (1982), but allow for information to be
endogenous. In contrast to Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a), the agent can acquire information
not only before signing, but also afterwards.
A principal (she) seeks to consume some quantity of a good which is produced by an agent
(he). More speciﬁcally, the agent can produce output q ≥ 0 at marginal cost β ∈ {β,β}, where
β < β. If he delivers the quantity q and receives a monetary transfer t, his payoﬀ is t − βq. The
principal’s payoﬀ is V (q) − t, where V is increasing, strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable
and satisﬁes V ′(0) = ∞ as well as V ′(∞) = 0.9
Both parties do not know β, the agent’s cost type. The common belief is that the low cost
type β obtains with probability p ∈ (0,1), and the high cost type β with 1 − p. However, while
information is symmetric at the outset, the agent can perfectly observe his type at cost γ > 0.10
This observation is possible both between contract oﬀer and signing, and afterwards. I assume
that information acquisition cannot be monitored by the principal or a third party, and that true
production costs are not veriﬁable (i.e., the situation involves both hidden action and hidden
information).
The principal can oﬀer a contract to govern the exchange. If the agent does not accept the
proposal, his payoﬀ is zero. If he accepts, no party can withdraw from it any more.
The timing of the situation is as follows:
1. Nature selects production costs β, and the principal oﬀers a contract.
2. The agent can privately observe β at cost γ.
3. The agent accepts or rejects the contract.
9The latter two assumption are to guarantee some (ﬁnite) quantity of production in both states of the world.
10All results would also hold if information was cheaper after the contract is signed.
54. If he accepted and did not acquire information before signing, he may do it now at same
cost; afterwards, the contract is executed. If the contract was rejected, the game ends.
3 First-best
As a benchmark, consider the situation where information acquisition and all available information
are veriﬁable, and where the agent cannot gather precontractual information. A contract for this
situation speciﬁes a probability α with which the agent acquires information; moreover, it speciﬁes
the quantity q to be delivered when the state of the world remains unknown, and quantities q and
q when the agent collects information and production costs turn out to be β and β, respectively.
Transfers are chosen such that the agent is reimbursed for information acquisition and production.
The optimal contract solves11
max
q,q,q,α
(1 − α)[V (q) − E[β]q]
+ α{−γ + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − βq]}.










The decision whether to collect information entails a trade oﬀ between the gain by tailoring output
to production costs, and the expenses due for information acquisition, γ. Speciﬁcally, denote by
W
FB(0) = V (q
FB) − E[β]q
FB
the surplus from a contract that does not respond to the realized state, and let
W
FB(1) = −γ + p[V (q
FB) − βq
FB] + (1 − p)[V (q
FB) − βq
FB]
11In what follows, I do not explicitly state the feasibility constraints that require (q,q,q) ≥ 0 and α ∈ [0,1].






0 if W FB(0) > W FB(1)
1 else.
In the ﬁrst best setting, courts can enforce information acquisition and its truthful revelation
if speciﬁed in the contract. Thus, the agent gets no rent, and the principal retains the entire
surplus. The optimal contract is therefore eﬃcient.
4 Contracts
In the original situation, contracts specify the quantity to be delivered and a transfer, both possibly
contingent on some form of communication. However, contracts cannot force the agent to acquire
information and to reveal his ﬁndings truthfully to the principal.
To ﬁnd out what contracts can achieve, I apply the revelation principle for multistage games
(Myerson 1986), which states that any equilibrium outcome of this situation can be implemented




According to such a contract, the principal recommends the agent before signing with probability
αB to collect information, and to stay uninformed otherwise. If information acquisition is solicited,
the agent is asked to reveal his type after signing. The principal implements (tB,q
B) if the agent
reports low production costs, and (tB,qB) otherwise.12 If the principal recommends before signing
to abstain from information acquisition, she submits a further recommendation after signing. With
probability αA, the agent is instructed to collect information now. Again, if information acqusition
is solicited, the agent is asked to reveal his type subsequently. The principal implements (tA,q
A)
if the agent reports low production costs, and (tA,qA) otherwise. In case the agent receives again
the recommendation to abstain from information acquisition, the principal implements (t,q). A
12The restriction to deterministic quantity allocations is without loss: the principal’s payoﬀ is concave in the
allocation. The agent is risk-neutral. Thus, the principal beneﬁts from replacing a stochastic allocation by its
expectation, and the agent does not care.
7direct contract is incentive compatible if the agent ﬁnds it best to be obedient and truthful, and
it is individually rational if he accepts it.
In the next section, I review the cases where information is either available only before or only
after signing, and in section 6 I argue that an optimal contract never needs to induce information
acquisition before signing. To provide more succint notation for the analysis, I now introduce also
contracts that can only recommend information acquisition at a particular date, i.e., either before
or after signing. (It will follow from the context which date is meant.) Such contracts are of the
form
C = {α,{(t,q)},{(t,q),(t,q)}}.
Here, α denotes the probability with which the principal recommends information acquisition at
the particular date. Transfer and quantity are implemented analogously to the general contracts
above. An incentive compatible contract of the form C yields the principal a proﬁt of
Π = (1 − α)[V (q) − t] + α{p[V (q) − t] + (1 − p)[V (q) − t]}.
If the principal recommends to stay uninformed, U0 = t − βq denotes the agent’s payoﬀ when
production costs are high, and U0 = t − βq the payoﬀ when they are low. Analogously, if the
principal instructs the agent to collect information and if he is obedient and truthful, let U1 = t−βq
and U1 = t − βq be the respective gross payoﬀs (i.e., excluding expenditure γ).
5 The cases without information before/after signing
I consider next as a further benchmark the well studied cases, where information is either available
only before or only after signing of the contract. In the ﬁrst case, the agent can appropriate any
rent the agent might obtain ex post, so that she retains the entire surplus. In the second case,
the principal must inevitably concede a share of the surplus if she wants to elicit information, and
even sometimes when she recommends to stay uninformed.
85.1 No information before signing
In this setting, only the recommendation after signing must be regarded. The following lemma
formalizes the incenive compatibility condition which must hold if the agent is to acquire informa 
tion and reveal it truthfully. Note that a recommendation to abstain from information gathering is
always incentive compatible in this setting, since the contract is already signed when information
becomes available.
Lemma 1. Deﬁne φ = (1 − p)p(β − β) as a measure for the size of uncertainty concerning
production costs, and denote by J(β) = β +
p
1−p(β − β) the high cost type’s "virtual costs". To
ensure incentive-compatibility after a recommendation to acquire information, the principal can
without loss of generality oﬀer a contract which satisﬁes
φ(q − q) ≥ γ (IA)
and U1 − U1 = (β − β)q +
γ
p.
Lemma 1 states that the low cost type obtains more payoﬀ than the high cost type, i.e. a rent,
to ensure that the acquisition and transmission of information is incentive compatible. When the
principal recommends to abstain from information acquisition, an agent with low costs will also
get an extra payoﬀ, namely
U0 − U0 = (β − β)q.
The individual rationality condition to ensure that the agent expects a non negative payoﬀ at
signing requires:
(1 − α)[U0 + p(β − β)q] + α[U1 + p(β − β)q] ≥ 0. (IR)
(IR) is an ex-ante participation constraint, which merely requires that the uninformed agent
is willing to accept the contract. This constraint does not preclude a loss for the agent if his
production costs are high, as long as that loss is outweighed by the payoﬀ for an agent with low
costs.
I proceed as usual and replace the transfers by the agent’s payoﬀs. The principal’s proﬁt then
reads:
Π = (1 − α)[V (q) − βq − U1] + α{−U1 + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q]}.




At the optimum, (IR) must bind, so that the agent does not obtain a share of the surplus.
The contracting problem can now be reformulated as
max











−γ − +p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − βq] s.t.(IA).
The optimal contract for this situation is eﬃcient, although the incentive compatibility con 
straint (IA) must be met if the agent is instructed to acquire information. To see this, note that
instead of a direct contract the principal may oﬀer the two part tariﬀ
T(q) = −max{W
FB(0),W
FB(1)} + V (q),
and let the agent select any quantity q. This tariﬀ implements the ﬁrst best information acquisi 
tion decision and the ﬁrst best quantity allocation; moreover, the principal obtains the ﬁrst best
surplus. Hence, (IA) does not bind. Intuitively, this scheme sells the principal’s bargaining power
to the agent and so eliminates the incentive compatibility condition. Since the agent is uninformed
at signing, the principal can charge as a price for her bargaining power the expected surplus of
the interaction. Note that the agent will incur a loss if his production costs turn out to be high.
5.2 No information after signing
In this case, analyzed in detail by Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a), the principal cannot instruct
the agent to acquire information after signing. Thus, only recommendations before signing are
relevant.
It turns out that this situation is less favorable for the principal than the case where the
agent can only collect information after signing. First, even the recommendation to abstain from
10information acquisition must be incentive compatible, since precontractual information is generally
valuable for the agent. Second, if the principal chooses to induce information acquisition, her
contract must be individually rational given the actual state of the world.
Suppose ﬁrst the principal recommends to abstain from information acquisition. In this case,
the individual rationality condition imposes an ex ante participation constraint:
U0 + p(β − β)q ≥ 0. (1)
The agent might ignore the principal’s recommendation and collect precontractual information
for a strategic purpose: to check the actual payoﬀ in advance in order to accept the contract only
if a state obtains where it yields a positive payoﬀ. Incentive compatibility requires that the price
of precontractual information, γ, exceeds the value of precontractual information—the option to
reject the contract if a state obtains where it yields a loss:13
(1 − p)U0 + γ ≥ 0. (2)
If instead the principal recommends to ﬁnd out the realized state of the world, lemma 1 speciﬁes
the incentive compatibility condition. Since information acquisition must happen before signing,
individual rationality now imposes an ex-post participation constraint, which requires that the
informed agent accepts the contract. This constraint precludes losses in both states of the world,
and is thus more restrictive than its ex ante counterpart. By lemma 1, it is enough only to rule
out a loss for the high cost type explicitly:
U1 ≥ 0. (3)
The principal’s contracting problem now takes the form
max
U0,U1,q,q,q,α
Π s.t. (1), (2), (3),and(IA).
In this situation, stochastic contracts are not useful; only α ∈ {0,1} can be optimal. To see this,
note that the agent may wait until any uncertainty concerning the principal’s recommendation
13The formulation of constraint (2) requires that only the high cost type can incur a loss from the contract. This
is without loss of generality since U0 = U0 + (β − β)q ≥ U0, so that the contract is only acceptable for the agent
if the low cost type obtains a positive payoﬀ.
11resolves, before he takes an action. Randomization over the recommendation therefore merely
amounts to randomization over the two contracts which, respectively, surely deter or surely induce
information acquisition. Clearly, the principal can do better by oﬀering the optimal deterministic
contract, which I derive next.
Deterring information gathering yields at most proﬁt
W(0) = max
q,U0
V (q) − βq − U0 s.t. (1)and(2).
As Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a) show, it is the price of precontractual information which
determines the binding constraint(s) in this problem.
Lemma 2. (Crémer, Khalil and Rochet 1998a) Deﬁne γd = φqFB and γc = φqFB. Denote by q′
the quantity allocation of an optimal contract which deters information gathering. Then
- for γ > γc, just (1) binds, and production is ex-ante eﬃcient, q′ = qFB.
- for γc ≥ γ > γd, both constraints bind, and there is under-production, q′ =
γ
φ.
- for γ ≤ γd, just (2) binds, and there is under-production, q′ = qFB.
Since the agent can compute his payoﬀ from the contract before signing, he may be able to
secure a share of the surplus. That is, it may be impossible for the principal to appropriate the
extra payoﬀ which an agent with low production costs obtains. Such a scheme would inevitably
inﬂict a loss on an agent with high production costs, so that precontractual information might be
worth its price γ.
If instead the principal induces information gathering, her maximum proﬁt is
W(1) = max
q,q
−γ − U1 + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q] s.t. (3)and(IA).
The ex post participation constraint (3) must bind at the optimum, so that the low cost type’s
rent cannot be appropriated. The principal maximizes only that fraction of the surplus she retains,
but not the entire surplus itself. Speciﬁcally, if information is cheap, so that (IA) does not bind,
she allocates eﬃciently to the low cost type (q′ = qFB), but demands an ineﬃciently low quantity
from the high cost type (q′ = V −1(J(β)) < qFB). When (IA) binds, on the other hand, the
quantity allocations are additionally distorted relative to the ﬁrst best to provide an incentive for
information acquisition and its truthful transmission to the principal.
12Finally, the principal compares the maximum proﬁts of the two contracts to ﬁnd out whether
to induce or deter information acquisition, i.e., to determine the optimal α. Since the respective
contracts yield less proﬁt than what the principal can obtain in the ﬁrst best (W(0) ≤ W FB(0)
as well as W(1) ≤ W FB(1)), there is no general order between α and αFB.
I conclude this section with ﬁgure 1, which depicts the considered benchmarks. Note that the
location of the various intersections depends on the parameters of the model and may well emerge
diﬀerently than displayed.







Figure 1: Maximum proﬁts when information acquisition is deterred or induced
6 Principal’s problem
This section develops the principal’s problem of ﬁnding an optimal contract in the original setting,
where information is available before as well as after signing. The key step is to realize that, in
equilibrium, no party gains if information is acquired before rather than after the contract is
signed, since it is equally costly at either date.
Lemma 3. If an optimal contract exists, there is also an optimal contract where the principal
13recommends to abstain from precontractual information gathering (i.e., with αB = 0).14
I will thus conﬁne attention to the class of contracts C that may only recommend to acquire
information after signing.
The principal’s problem combines constraints of the cases where information can be acquired
either only before or only after the contract is signed. Similarly to the latter case, the agent may
possibly get a recommendation to observe his type after signing, but there will be no such recom 
mendation before. Hence, the contract must ﬁrst satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
imposed by lemma 1, to ensure that the agent is obedient and truthful when the principal solicits
information. Second, the contract must be acceptable for the uninformed agent:
(1 − α)[U0 + p(β − β)q] + α[U1 + p(β − β)q] ≥ 0. (IR)
But lemma 3 adds a further incentive compatibility constraint, which had to be considered
in the case information without information after signing. Namely, the agent must not gain by
precontractual information gathering; also in this setting, this would only serve the strategic
purpose to reject the contract when it yields a loss given the true state of the world:15
(1 − p)[(1 − α)U0 + αU1] + (1 − α)γ ≥ 0. (NIA)
As its analog (2), this constraint requires that the price of precontractual information is too high
relative to its value (i.e., the option to reject the contract if a state obtains where it yields a loss).
However, that price is now (1−α)γ—and therefore ﬁxed by the principal’s recommendation. This
is because with probability α the agent will acquire information after signing, in which case the
expense γ is due anyway. (Note that the value of precontractual information, on the other hand,
is not ﬁxed by the recomendation, since U0 and U1 are chosen by the principal.)
(IR) is an ex ante participation constraint. However, (NIA) may in fact impose an ex post
participation constraint, which requires that the informed agent accepts the contract, and thus
would be more restrictive. Speciﬁcally, this is the case if the principal will surely recommend to
ﬁnd out production costs after signing (α = 1). Precontractual information is then eﬀectively for
14Without the restriction to deterministic allocations, the outcome (i.e., quantity allocation and transfer) of any
contract could be implemented with a contract where αB = 0.
15Due to lemma 1 and an argument as in footnote 13, the low cost type cannot incur a loss from the contract.
14free, and by (NIA) even the high cost type must not incur a loss from the contract. On the other
hand, when the principal will not solicit information (α = 0), precontractual information costs γ.
In that case, it may well be suﬃcient to ensure just ex ante participation (namely if γ > γd, cf.
lemma 2). The speciﬁcation of α hence involves a trade oﬀ between the eﬃciency gain through
information acquisition on the one hand, and, via the price of precontractual information, the
share of the surplus which can be appropriated, on the other hand. This paper’s insight is that, to
solicit information at least with some probability and yet retain the entire surplus, the principal
might submit her recommendation stochatically.
Now that all constraints are identiﬁed, the principal’s problem can be stated formally as
max
U0,U1,q,q,q,α
Π s.t. (NIA), (IR)and(IA).
It turns out that if the principal had to speak out a deterministic recommendation, contracts
are as in the case where information can only be gathered before signing (cf. section 5.2). Intu 
itively, this holds because the agent can already anticipate before signing any deterministic future
recommendation. The relevant incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are
therefore the same in the two settings.
Lemma 4. The best deterministic contract is identical to the optimal contract for the situation
where information is only available before signing. In particular, with α = 0 (resp. α = 1), the
principal’s maximum proﬁt is W(0) (resp. W(1)).
The next section argues that deterministic contracts may be suboptimal.
7 Randomization
To understand the intuition that drives the analysis, consider the following example. Let
V (q) =
√
q, β = 1, β = 5, p = 1
2, γ = 1
18.
This yields
E[β] = 3, J(β) = 9, φ = 1.
15Suppose for the moment, the agent could only acquire information after signing (cf. section
5.1), so that the principal retains the entire surplus and oﬀers a contract to maximize it. The
optimal contract would elicit information to implement (qFB,qFB) = (1
4,0.01); the principal earns
W FB(1) = 0.0944 and an agent with high production costs U1 = −0.02. Without information
(and a quantity allocation of qFB = 1
36), the principal gets W FB(0) = 1
12 and the high cost type
U0 = − 1
18. Now return to the original setting, where the additional constraint (NIA) must be
satisﬁed to prevent precontractual information gathering. The ﬁrst contract is no longer incentive 
compatible: the value of precontractual information, to avoid an expected loss of 0.01, exceeds its
(eﬀective) price of zero. Under the second contract, precontractual information is worth 1
36 but
costs 1
18. So that contract remains feasible. As can be shown, it yields as much payoﬀ as the best
contract that solicits information with certainty. However, the leeway of (NIA) suggests that the
principal might solicit information with some probability less than one to implement (qFB,qFB),
but yet retain the entire surplus. And indeed, in the present example, this is feasible for any
α ≤ 0.735. Thus, she may obtain a proﬁt of 0.265 · 1
12 + 0.735 · 0.0944 = 0.0914 with a stochastic
contract, roughly ten percent more than with any deterministic contract.
The example demonstrates the principal’s trade oﬀ between the eﬃciency gain through in 
formation acquisition and the price of precontractual information. Eﬃciency requires to elicit
information and demand a cost contingent quantity. However, if the principal recommends infor 
mation acquisition with certainty, the price of precontractual information is zero (while its value to
the agent is postive). In this case, the contract must satisfy the ex post participation constraint,
and consequently concedes surplus. A stochastic contract, on the other hand, generates less sur 
plus but ﬁxes a positive price of precontractual information—in the example, it is so high that the
contract just needs to be ex ante acceptable and consequently appropriates all surplus. Although
this scheme inﬂicts a loss on an agent with high production costs, there is no incentive to gather
precontractual information: the stochastic contract entails uncertainty, whether precontractual
information will be of any use after signing, and that risk outweighs the risk of incurring a loss
from the contract.
The remainder of this section shows that a stochastic contract may indeed be optimal, as
indicated by the example. However, it is not insightful to solve the principal’s problem explicitly.16
16As shown below, both (NIA) and (IR) must bind at an optimum with randomization. The resulting maximiza-
16Instead, I next prove existence of a solution. This will furnish a convenient criterion to examine
whether the principal should randomize over her recommendations.
Lemma 5. The principal’s problem has a solution.
In the following, I split the principal’s problem into two steps. First, I consider α as a parameter
and optimize over the remaining choice variables. Let W(α) denote the resulting maximum value.
The second step is to ﬁnd an α which maximizes W(α).17 However, the second step is not needed
to check whether the optimal contract is stochastic. By lemma 5, it actually suﬃces to ﬁnd an
α ∈ (0,1) such that
W(α) > max{W(0),W(1)}.
This inequality necessarily requires that randomization over recommendations must yield the
principal more proﬁt than randomization over the two deterministic contracts. In the two cases
without information before/after signing, that was impossible. However, the trade oﬀ between the
eﬃciency gain through information acquisition and the price of precontractual information only
arises in the original situation with permanently available information.
Lemma 6. Let α ∈ (0,1). Then W(α) > (1 − α)W(0) + αW(1) if and only if γ > γd.
The proof shows that the principal’s problem can be reformulated, so that α only appears in
the objective function and the individual rationality condition. In particular, when the princi 
pal’s recommendation to acquire information gets more likely, this constraint is relaxed. But the
principal only beneﬁts from the additional leeway if the constraint is actually binding at α = 0
(cf. lemma 2); otherwise, randomization just yields a convex combination of the proﬁts from
the two deterministic contracts. (On the other hand, there must be a cutoﬀ less than one, such
that the individual rationality constraint gets slack if α exceeds it and (NIA) becomes binding.
Technically, it is this change in the binding constraints which can establish the optimality of a
stochastic contract.)
It is now possible to state the main result, which generalizes the insight provided by the
example. In situations where the two deterministic contracts perform roughly equally well, the
tion problem is neither concave nor convex.
17This procedure is feasible: due to the assumptions on the principal’s payoﬀ function V , the ﬁrst step yields a
(unique) solution. A solution to the second step exists by lemma 5.
17principal potentially oﬀers a stochastic contract, designed such that she retains the entire surplus.
As a ﬁnal piece of notation, let   γ be the intersection of W(0) and W(1).18
Proposition 1. If   γ > γd, randomization is optimal for an interval containing   γ.19 Moreover, if
randomization is optimal the ex-ante participation constraint (IR) binds, so that the entire surplus
accrues to the principal.
While the principal retains the entire surplus with the stochastic contract, this contract does
not maximize the surplus—ﬁrst of all just because it is stochastic. This is because the incentive 
compatibility constraint (NIA) necessarily binds at the optimum, too.20
8 Conclusion
I studied the optimal contract oﬀer to an uninformed agent who can acquire costly information
about his type either before or after the contract is signed. In such a situation, the principal
tries to deter precontractual information gathering in order to retain surplus. When she solicits
information after signing with certainty, the (eﬀective) price of precontractual information is zero
since the costs of information acquisition accrue anyway. In this case, the contract must satisfy
an ex post participation constraint and consequently cedes surplus to the agent. On the other
hand, when the principal with certainty does not solicit information after signing, precontractual
information is costly. In that case, the contract possibly just needs to pass an ex ante participation
constraint so that the principal may retain the entire surplus. Hence, the principal trades oﬀ the
eﬃciency gain through information acquisition against a high price of precontractual information.
This trade oﬀ is absent in the well studied cases, where information is either not available or not
costly at each date. To solve it optimally, the principal might oﬀer a stochastic contract.
There are interesting ways to develop this paper’s ideas further. First, how does the optimal
18This intersection must be unique since W(0) is non-decreasing while W(1) strictly decreases. Moreover, as the
principal’s utility function V is concave and the feasible set of contracts convex, the respective maximum proﬁts
are concave as well and thus continuous on the interior of their domain, (0,∞) (cf. de la Fuente 2000, theorem
2.12, p. 313 and theorem 2.14, p. 252). Since, at γ = 0, W(0) < W(1), this establishes existence of   γ.
19It can be shown that the condition requires a suﬃciently high value for p.
20This follows by a similar argument as in the proof of proposition 1.
18auction look like when bidders can acquire information concerning their valuation both before
and after they decide on particpation? Crémer, Spiegel and Zheng (2009) analyze auction design
in the case without information at the ﬁrst date.21 They ﬁnd that the auctioneer should solicit
information from the bidders sequentially, until she meets somebody whose valuation is suﬃciently
high. When information is also available before signing, the designer could raise the price of
precontractual information for a particular bidder not just with a stochastic mechanism, but also
by changing the order in which bidders are approached. Second, when the agent can select among
several eﬀort levels to acquire information of diﬀerent precision at diﬀerent costs, which level
should the principal implement? This generalization adds a further dimension to the principal’s
trade oﬀ. In particular, she has greater leeway to ﬁx the price of precontractual information.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. The obedience constraints to ensure that the agent indeed acquires information
are:
pU1 + (1 − p)U1 − γ ≥ U1 + p(β − β)q
pU1 + (1 − p)U1 − γ ≥ U1 − (1 − p)(β − β)q.
(O)
The agent is honest, i.e. he truthfully transmits his ﬁndings to the principal, if:
U1 ≥ U1 − (β − β)q
U1 ≥ U1 + (β − β)q.
(T)
(O) is equivalent to
U1 ≤ U1 − (β − β)q −
γ
p




This implies (T) and is equivalent to (IA) together with
U1 − U1 ∈
 
(β − β)q +
γ
p





21See Shi (2009) for the case without information after signing.
19Suppose contract C = {α,{(t,q)},{(t,q),(t,q)}} satisﬁes all constraints and yields U1 − U1 =
(β −β)q+
γ
p +r. Consider contract C′ = {α,{(t+
pα
1−αr,q)},{(t−r,q),(t,q)}}. The two contracts
implement the same quantity allocation, and the principal pays the same transfer in expection.




1 = (β − β)q +
γ
p, so
that the condition in the lemma holds. (T) and (O) are met by C′. (NIA) and (IR) only restrict
U
′ = U and U
′
= U (i.e., these payoﬀs are identical under C and C′), so that C′ satisﬁes these
constraints as well.
The principal’s proﬁt function, Π, is obtained by replacing tranfers with the agent’s payoﬀs.
Proof of lemma 2. This follows from Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a), proposition 2.





In terms of the principal’s proﬁt, C is a lottery over the contracts22
C
′ = {αB = 0,αA,{(t,q)},{(tA,q
A),(tA,qA)}},
drawn with probability 1 − αB, and
C
′′ = {αB = 1,αA,{(tB,q
B),(tB,qB)}},
drawn with probability αB. Note that C′ and C′′ are feasible as well, since the agent may choose
his optimal strategy after the principal submits the recommendation between contract oﬀer and
signing. The principal can thus (weakly) increase proﬁts by oﬀering the best contract among C′
and C′′ with certainty. To prove the lemma, I only need to show that contract
˜ C
′′ = {αB = 0,αA = 1,{(tB,q
B),(tB,qB)}},
which implements the same pair of transfer and quantity allocation as C′′ but recommends to
abstain from precontractual information gathering, is feasible as well.
22To economize on notation, I omit those pairs of transfer and quantity allocation that are implemented with
probability zero.
20Suppose contract ˜ C′′ is oﬀered. Since C′′ is individually rational, there is no (strict) incentive for
the agent to acquire information already before signing, as both types would accept the contract.
Hence, ˜ C′′ is incentive compatible before signing. Since C′′ is incentive compatible before signing,
purchasing information must yield a non negative payoﬀ to the uninformed agent. Hence, ˜ C′′
is individually rational. Further, it follows that the agent prefers to collect information after
signing. Since C′′ is incentive compatible after signing, the agent has an incentive to report his
type truthfully. Hence, ˜ C′′ is incentive compatible after signing, and ﬁnally feasible.
Proof of lemma 4. This follows by comparison of the two optimization problems.
Proof of lemma 5. The proof requires additional notation. Fix α ∈ [0,1] in the principal’s problem




Π(α) s.t. (NIAα), (IRα)and(IAα).
To prove lemma 5, it has to be shown that supα∈[0,1] W(α) is attained. By Weierstrass’ theorem,
this is true if W(α) is continuous as a function of α. This, in turn, holds by the maximum theorem
(see de la Fuente 2000, theorem 2.1, p. 301) if the correspondence which assigns to each α the set
of feasible choice variables is compact valued and continuous. However, this correspondence is not
compact (there are no upper bounds on U0, U1, q, and q).23 By adding non binding constraints,
I will replace it by another correspondence F ∗, such that maximization with respect to F ∗ yields
the same maximum value W(α), and such that F ∗ is compact valued and continuous. From the
maximum theorem then follows that W(α) is continuous, and the proof is ﬁnished. I will use the
following lemma.24
Lemma. Let gi(U0,U1,q,q,q,α) : R5 × [0,1] → R be a continuous function that is aﬃne given α
for all i = 1,...,I, and deﬁne the correspondence F ∗ : [0,1] →→ R5 by
F
∗(α) = {(U0,U1,q,q,q) : g
i(U0,U1,q,q,q,α) ≥ 0 for all i = 1,...,I}.









1,q′,q′,q′,α0) > 0 for all i; then F ∗ is continuous at α0.
23q is bounded above due to (IAα).
24See de la Fuente (2000) theorem 2.2, p. 303.
21Denote the feasible set in problem P(α), as given by (NIAα), (IRα), (IAα) and the implicit
non negativity constraints on quantity allocations, by F(α). From the main text follows that, for
k > 0,
U0 ≤ k, U1 ≤ k, q ≤ q





would be non binding as constraints in P(α). Add them to P(α), which yields a bounded feasible
set. Denote it by F ∗(α). Being an intersection of closed half spaces, F ∗(α) is closed, and therefore
compact. It can be described by level sets of continuous functions gi(U0,U1,q,q,q,α), where




1,q′,q′,q′) = (0,0,qFB,qFB,max{qFB,qFB +
γ
φ}) all
constraints are satisﬁed with strict inequality. Hence, the correspondence F ∗ is continuous by the
lemma. Replacing the feasible set F(α) in problem P(α) by F ∗(α) yields the same maximum
value W(α), because the solution with respect to F(α) is contained in F ∗(α), and F ∗(α) itself is
contained in F(α).
Proof of lemma 6. First, note that it is without loss of generality to set U1 = 0 (if necessary, U0
can be replaced by X = U0 + α
1−αU1). The optimal contract then solves25
max
U0,q,q,q,α
(1 − α)[V (q) − βq − U0] + α{−γ + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q]}
s.t (1 − p)U0 + γ ≥ 0 (NIA0)
U0 + p(β − β)(q + α
1−αq) ≥ 0 (IR+)
and(IA)
I now work with the reformulated problem to prove the lemma. By deﬁnition,
W(α) = max
U0,q,q,q
Π = (1 − α)[V (q) − βq − U0]
+ α{−γ + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q]}
+ λ1(α)[(1 − p)U0 + γ]
+ λ2(α)[U0 + p(β − β)(q + α
1−αq)]
+ λ3(α)[φ(q − q) − γ],
25Constraint (IR+) is not well-deﬁned at α = 1. Let it require U0 ∈ R in this case.
22where the λs denote non negative Lagrange multipliers. Also by deﬁnition,




V (q) − βq − U0
+λ1(0)[(1 − p)U0 + γ]






− γ + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q]
+λ3(1)[φ(q − q) − γ]
 
.
This is equivalent to
(1 − α)W(0) + αW(1) = max
U0,q,q,q
(1 − α)[V (q) − βq − U0]
+ α{−γ + p[V (q) − βq] + (1 − p)[V (q) − J(β)q]}
+λ1(0)[(1 − p)U0 + γ]
+λ2(0)[U0 + p(β − β)q]
+λ3(1)[φ(q − q) − γ].
Whenever λ2(0) > 0 or, equivalently, γ > γd (cf. lemma 2), the strict inequality holds as asserted
in the lemma. Otherwise, both sides are equal.
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose   γ > γd. Let α ∈ (0,1) and γ =   γ. Then, W(0) = W(1) =
(1 − α)W(0) + αW(1) < W(α), where the inequality follows from lemma 6. By continuity of
W(α) in γ (which follows by the same argument as in footnote 18), this holds for a whole interval
containing γ∗. To see the second claim, note that if the constraint is slack, the principal’s maximum
proﬁt is aﬃne in α, so that (generically) the choice of α is not optimal.
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